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Abstract²Supply chains have become complex because of 
the globalization and outsourcing, and the lack of visibility 
across the entire network makes it difficult to manage the 
ULVNV7KHFRQFHSWRI µ6\VWHP VXUYLYDO VLJQDWXUH¶KDVUHFHQWO\
been developed for capturing the network configuration of a 
system comprising different types of components. Its utilization 
in the evaluation of system reliability is unique in terms of its 
capability of segregating the network signature from the 
probability distribution of failure time of components. We 
introduce this concept in the realm of supply chain risk 
management. This novel application can be helpful in 
evaluating supply network reliability through gauging two 
distinct features of network configuration and risk profiles of 
the suppliers. The application is illustrated with the help of two 
simple examples. The technique can be of significant value to 
the supply chain managers in taking strategic decisions 
concerning suppliers and network configuration. We have also 
adapted the existing risk importance measures in the field of 
reliability engineering for their application in the domain of 
supply network reliability. 
 
Keywords²Supply chain risk management; system survival 
signature; supply network reliability; network configuration  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Supply chain risk management is an active area of 
research that has been receiving a great deal of interest from 
academics and practitioners [1].The uncertainties in supply 
and demand, global outsourcing and short product life cycles 
have made the management of supply chain risks quite 
challenging [2] 7KH WRGD\¶V OHDQHU DQG MXVW-in-time 
gloabalized supply chains are more vulnerable to operational 
and external (natural and man-made) disruptions than ever 
before [3].  
There are a number of key debates in the literature of risk 
focusing on the qualitative and quantitative aspects of risk 
assessment and therefore, choice of methodology must be 
given due consideration before its application in the field of 
supply chain risk management [4]. The application of risk 
theory to supply chain management is still in its early stages 
of research and there is requirement of conducting empirical 
studies of already established models. There is also a major 
research gap of exploring established risk practices in other 
fields for application in the domain of supply chain risk 
management [4]. 
Supply chain disruptions arising from natural disasters, 
plant fires, terrorism and supplier bankruptcy, have been the 
source of major damages in various industries. In order to 
mitigate the risks, supply chain managers adopt various 
strategies including addition of inventories, multi-sourcing 
and designing standardized parts. Supply chains have 
become too complex because of globalization and off-
shoring of manufacturing operations that expose the entire 
chain to various types of disasters [5]. The individual risks 
are interconnected and risk mitigation strategy at one end 
may result in exacerbating another risk [6]. 
Reliability of a supply network can be expressed in terms 
of connectivity across the two ends of the network in case of 
any disruption taking place within the entire chain. 
Connectivity reliability is the probability that guarantees 
functioning of links between given pairs of nodes in a 
network. The existing literature on supply network 
disruptions considers various approaches ranging from the 
social network perspective to the stochastic modeling. 
However, the concept of engineering systems reliability has 
not been explored much within the domain of supply chain 
risk management. The existing studies focus on the 
conventional computation of supply network reliability 
through decomposition of the network into series and parallel 
structures [7-9]. However, complex networks may not be 
feasible to model through this approach. Furthermore, the 
effect of uncertainties of the risk profiles of suppliers is not 
considered in relation to the network configuration of the 
entire supply chain. We present a novel application of the 
recently developed concept of system survival signature 
within the domain of supply chain risk management and 
demonstrate the concept with the help of simple examples. 
Future research in this area can help supply chain managers 
take effective strategic decisions in managing complex 
supply chains. The concept of system signature is presented 
in Section II followed by the description of risk importance 
measures in Section III. Section IV explicates the application 
of system survival signature within the realm of supply 
network. Future research agenda is presented in Section V. 
II. SYSTEM SIGNATURE 
System signature captures the configuration of different 
components in the system. The concept was developed for 
evaluating the survival distribution of a system that is the 
function of network configuration and the probability 
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distribution of the failure of components. Following 
definitions and notations are useful for comprehension of the 
concept. 
For a system with n components, state vector  ൌሺଵǡ ଶǡ ǥ ǡ ୬ሻ א ሼ ?ǡ ?ሽ୬ǡ where for each , ୧ ൌ  ? if the  
component is working and ୧ ൌ  ? if it is not working. 
Definition. Consider the space ሼ ?ǡ ?ሽ୬ of all possible state 
vectors for an n-component system. The structure function ɔ ׷  ሼ ?ǡ ?ሽ୬ ՜ ሼ ?ǡ ?ሽ is a mapping that associates those state 
vectors  for which the system works with the value 1 and 
those state vectors  for which the system fails with the value 
0 [10]. 
Definition. Let ɒ represent a coherent system of order . 
$VVXPHWKDWWKHOLIHWLPHVRIWKHV\VWHP¶VQFRPSRQHQWVDUH
independent and identically distributed ሺǤ Ǥ Ǥ ሻ according to 
the (continuous) distribution	. The signature of the system ɒ, denoted by த , or simply by  when the corresponding 
system is clear from the context, is an n-dimensional 
probability vector whose  element ୧ is equal to the 
probability that the  component failure causes the system 
to fail. In brief, ୧ ൌ ሺ ൌ ୧ǣ୬ሻ, where  is the failure time 
of the system and ୧ǣ୬ is the  order statistic of the  
component failure times, that is, the time of the  
component failure [10]. 
The concept of system signature was introduced for 
evaluating the reliability of a system consisting of m 
components having  failure times [11]. System signature 
possesses the unique feature of segregating the system 
structure from the random failure times of the components. 
A. System Survival Signature 
A closely related concept of system signature has 
recently been introduced for dealing with different types of 
components within a system [12] /HW ĭሺሻ, for  ൌ ?ǡ ?ǡ ?ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ , denote the probability that the system is working 
when  of the components are working. The concept is 
UHVWULFWHG WR FRKHUHQW V\VWHPV ZKLFK PHDQV WKDW ĭሺሻis an 
increasing function of  DVVXPLQJ WKDW ĭሺ ?ሻ ൌ  ? and 
ĭሺሻ ൌ  ?. There are ൫୫୪ ൯ state vectors  with precisely  
components ୧ ൌ  ?, so with  ? ୧ ൌ ୫୧ୀଵ ; the set of these state 
vectors are denoted by ୪. Because of  assumption for the 
failure times of  components, all the state vectors are 
equally likely to happen, therefore 
 
Ɍሺ݈ሻ ൌ ൫௠௟ ൯ିଵ  ? ߔ൫ݔ൯௫אௌ೗  ( 1 ) 
 
Let ୲ א ሼ ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ሽ denote the number of components 
working in the system at time  ൐  ? and 	ሺሻ be the 
cumulative distribution function of the failure time of the 
components, then for  א ሼ ?ǡ ?ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ሽ 
 ܲሺܥ௧ ൌ ݈ሻ ൌ ቀ݈݉ቁ ሾܨሺݐሻሿ௠ି௟ሾ ? െ ܨሺݐሻሿ௟ ( 2 ) 
 
ܲሺ ௌܶ ൐ ݐሻ ൌ ෍ ߔሺ݈ሻܲሺܥ௧ ൌ ݈ሻ௠௟ୀ଴  ( 3 ) 
B. Systems with Multiple Types of Components 
/HW ĭሺଵǡ ଶǡ ǥ ǡ ୏ሻ for ୩ ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ?ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ୩, denote the 
probability (system survival signature) that the system is 
working when ୩ of the components of type are working for 
each  א ሼ ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ሽ. There are ቀ୫ౡ୪ౡ ቁ state vectors ୩ with 
precisely ୩ of its ୩ components ୧୩ ൌ  ?, so with  ? ୧୩ ൌ ୩୫ౡ୧ୀଵ ; the set of these state vectors of components of 
type  are denoted by ୪୩ while ୪భǡ୪మǡǥǡ୪ౡ  indicates the set of 
all state vectors of the system  for which  ? ୧୩ ൌ ୩ǡ  ൌ୫ౡ୧ୀଵ ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ . Because of  assumption for the failure times of ୩ components of type , all the state vectors ୩ א ୪୩are 
equally likely to happen, therefore 
Ɍሺ݈ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݈௄ሻ ൌ ൤ ? ቀ௠ೖ௟ೖ ቁିଵ௄௞ୀଵ ൨ ൈ  ? ߔ൫ݔ൯௫אௌ೗భǡ೗మǡǥǡ೗ೖ  ( 4 ) 
Let ୲୩ א ሼ ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ ୩ሽ denote the number of components 
of type working in the system at time  ൐  ? and 	୩ሺሻ be 
the cumulative distribution function of the failure time of the 
components, then for ୩ א ሼ ?ǡ ?ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ୩ሽǡ  ൌ  ?ǡ ?ǡ ǥ ǡ  
 ܲሺ ሩ ሼܥ௧௞ ൌ ݈௞ሽሻ ൌ ෑ ܲሺܥ௧௞ ൌ ݈௞ሻ௄௞ୀଵ௞ୀଵǡǥǡ௄  
 
 
ൌ ෑ ൬݉௞݈௞ ൰ ሾܨ௞ሺݐሻሿ௠ೖି௟ೖሾ ? െ ܨ௞ሺݐሻሿ௟ೖ௄௞ୀଵ  ( 5 ) 
 ܲሺ ௌܶ ൐ ݐሻ ൌ ෍ ǥ௠భ௟భୀ଴ ෍ ߔሺ݈ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݈௄ሻܲሺሩሼܥ௧௞ ൌ ݈௞ሽሻ௄௞ୀଵ௠಼௟಼ୀ଴  
 
 
ൌ ෍ ǥ௠భ௟భୀ଴ ෍ ሾߔሺ݈ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݈௄ሻ௠಼௟಼ୀ଴ ෑ ܲሺܥ௧௞ ൌ ݈௞ሻ௄௞ୀଵ ሿ 
 
 
ൌ ෍ ǥ௠భ௟భୀ଴ ෍ ሾߔሺ݈ଵǡ ǥ ǡ ݈௄ሻ௠಼௟಼ୀ଴ ෑሼ൬݉௞݈௞ ൰ ሾܨ௞ሺݐሻሿ௠ೖି௟ೖሾ ?௄௞ୀଵെ ܨ௞ሺݐሻሿ௟ೖሽሿ ( 6 ) 
 
Equation (6) represents the survival function of the 
system segregating the survival signature of the system from 
the probability of the failure times of individual group of 
components. It is the unique feature of this technique that 
once the survival signature of the complete network is 
determined, different probability distributions of the failure 
time of components can be examined for the analysis of 
system reliability. Furthermore, the importance of specific 
group of components can be visualized through simulation of 
the model. 
III. RISK IMPORTANCE MEASURES 
There are a few significant importance measures in the 
field of risk and reliability [13]. The existing importance 
measures have been adapted for their application in the field 
of supply network reliability as shown in Table I. 
TABLE I.  RISK IMPORTANCE MEASURES 
Measure Abbreviation Principle Adaptation to System Survival  
Risk reduction ܴܴ ܴሺܾܽݏ݁ሻ െ ܴሺݔ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ ܵሺ݈௞ ൌ ݉௞ሻ െ ܵሺܾܽݏ݁ሻ 
Fussel-Vesely ܨܸ ܴሺܾܽݏ݁ሻ െ ܴሺݔ௜ ൌ  ?ሻܴሺܾܽݏ݁ሻ  ܵሺ݈௞ ൌ ݉௞ሻ െ ܵሺܾܽݏ݁ሻ ? െ ܵሺܾܽݏ݁ሻ  
Risk achievement 
worth ܴܣܹ ܴሺݔ௜ ൌ  ?ሻܴሺܾܽݏ݁ሻ   ? െ ܵሺ݈௞ ൌ  ?ሻ ? െ ܵሺܾܽݏ݁ሻ  
Birnbaum importance ܤܫ ܴሺݔ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ െ ܴሺݔ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ ܵሺ݈௞ ൌ ݉௞ሻ െ ܵሺ݈௞ ൌ  ?ሻ 
 
 
Following definitions are used in Table I. 
x ܴሺݔ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ : the increased risk level without basic 
eventݔ௜  or with basic event ݔ௜ assumed failed, 
x ܴሺݔ௜ ൌ  ?ሻ : the decreased risk level with the basic 
eventݔ௜  optimised or assumed to be perfectly 
reliable, 
x ܴሺܾܽݏ݁ሻ : the present risk level, 
x ܵሺ݈௞ ൌ  ?ሻ : the decreased system survival probability 
with the disruption of ݉௞ components, 
x ܵሺ݈௞ ൌ ݉௞ሻ : the increased system survival 
probability with all ݉௞ components working, 
x ܵሺܾܽݏ݁ሻ : the present system survival probability, 
 
7KH5$:SUHVHQWVDPHDVXUHRIWKHµZRUWK¶RIWKHW\SH
RI FRPSRQHQWV LQ µDFKLHYLQJ¶ WKH FXUUHQW YDOXHRI ULVN DQG
represents the importance of maintaining the current level of 
reliability for the type of components. The risk measures 
contain important information for the managers in taking 
appropriate strategic decisions as shown in Table II. The 
same table has been adapted for application in the realm of 
supply network as shown in Table III. 
 
TABLE II.  INFORMATION IN RISK MEASURES [13] 
Risk 
significance ࡲࢂ Safety significance ࡮ࡵ Potential for safety improvement Potential for relaxation 
High High 
Component, 
defence in 
depth 
No 
High Low Component No 
Low High 
Do not 
degrade 
component 
No 
Low Low No 
Component, 
defence in 
depth 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE III.  INFORMATION IN RISK MEASURES FOR SUPPLY NETWORK 
STRATEGIES 
Risk 
significance ࡲࢂ Safety significance ࡮ࡵ Potential for improvement Potential for relaxation 
High High 
Supplier, 
network 
structure 
No 
High Low Supplier No 
Low High 
Maintain risk 
profile of 
supplier 
No 
Low Low No 
Supplier, 
Network 
structure 
 
 
IV. APPLICATION OF SYSTEM SURVIVAL SIGNATURE IN 
SUPPLY NETWORK 
A. Example No. 1 
We apply the concepts of system survival signature and 
risk importance measures in the realm of supply network. In 
order to facilitate clear understanding of the concepts, we 
present two example models. The first example illustrating a 
supply network is shown in Fig. 1. The suppliers have been 
segregated into three groups on the basis of their risk 
profiles. In order to calculate the survival signature, the 
network was modeled in R software using the 
µ5HOLDELOLW\7KHRU\¶ SDFNDJH [14]. The resulting network 
obtained through running of the code is shown in Fig. 2.  
The survival function (non-zero values) calculated in R 
software is shown in Table IV (Appendix). A code was 
developed in Matlab R2009a for the detailed analysis of the 
network reliability. The probability distributions 
representing the risk profiles of different types of suppliers 
were assumed as exponential. Firstly, in order to calculate 
the impact of the reliability of each type of suppliers on the 
overall reliability of the network, the specific supplier was 
assumed to be perfectly reliable with the survival 
distributions of other two types fixed at their current level. 
The results of the simulation are depicted in Fig. 3. Type 3 
suppliers were assumed to be most reliable. The 
improvement in the network reliability can be observed 
through the displacement of system reliability curve towards 
the right. It is evident that Type 2 suppliers have the major 
impact on the system reliability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Supply network representing groups of risk profiles.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Network schematic in R software.  
In order to compare the different types of suppliers on 
the basis of network configuration, we assign same 
probability distribution to each type of suppliers. The impact 
of the reliability of each type of suppliers on the overall 
reliability of the network is determined through the same 
procedure as described earlier. The results depicted in Fig. 4 
clearly reveal that the Type 3 suppliers have the major 
impact on the overall reliability of the system. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Impact of supplier type on the basis of risk profile.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Impact of supplier type on the basis of network configuration.  
Now, we consider discrete reliability values for each 
type of suppliers. The reliability values of the three types of 
suppliers are assumed as 0.6, 0.3 and 0.9 respectively. The 
reliability of the network is calculated as 0.75. The impact 
of the reliability of each type of suppliers on the overall 
reliability of the supply network is shown in Fig. 5. It is 
evident that Type 2 suppliers have the major impact while 
the Type 1 suppliers control the overall reliability within a 
limited range.  
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 Fig. 5. Impact of supplier type reliability on the network reliability.  
The risk importance measures are calculated for each 
type of suppliers as shown in Fig. 6. Type 2 suppliers have 
high values for all the three measures of Fussel-Vesely 
(FV), Risk achievement worth (RAW) and Birnbaum 
importance (BI). Type 1 suppliers have got low values in all 
the three measures. 
 
Fig. 6. Risk importance measures.  
The risk measures have been explained with the help of 
system reliability graph as shown in Fig. 7. The FV value of 
each type of suppliers is directly proportional to the relative 
difference between the current system reliability value and 
the one corresponding to the perfect reliability of the 
specific type of supplier. The BI value corresponds to the 
difference between the system reliability values relative to 
the two extreme reliability states of each type of suppliers. 
RAW value is proportional to the deviation of the current 
system reliability from the one corresponding to the absolute 
unreliable state of each type of suppliers. 
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Fig. 7. Representation of risk importance measures.  
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The reliability targets can be allocated between the 
supplier types based on the desired system reliability. The 
contour plots of the reliability allocation between two types 
of suppliers keeping the constant reliability values of Types 
3, 2 and 1 suppliers are shown in Fig. 8, 9 and 10 
respectively. Type 2 and 3 suppliers have dominant impact 
on the overall system reliability. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Reliability allocation between types 1 and 2 suppliers.  
 
Fig. 9. Reliability allocation between types 1 and 3 suppliers.  
B. Example No. 2 
In the second example, the suppliers have been 
segregated into four groups on the basis of their risk profiles 
as shown in Fig. 11. The resulting network obtained through 
the R software is shown in Fig. 12.  
 
 
Fig. 10. Reliability allocation between types 2 and 3 suppliers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Supply network representing groups of risk profiles. 
The survival function (non-zero values) calculated in R 
software is shown in Table V (Appendix). The probability 
distributions representing the risk profiles of different types 
of suppliers were assumed as exponential. The survival 
probability of each type of suppliers and that of the system 
are shown in Fig. 13. The relative impact of the reliability of 
each type of suppliers on the network reliability is depicted 
in Fig. 14. It is evident that Type 2 suppliers have the major 
impact on the system reliability. 
The network configuration based impact of the reliability 
of each type of suppliers on the overall reliability of the 
network is shown in Fig. 15. The results reveal that the Type 
4 suppliers have the major impact on the overall reliability 
of the system. 
Now, we consider discrete reliability values for each 
type of suppliers. The reliability values of the four types of 
suppliers are assumed as 0.7, 0.5, 0.8 and 0.6 respectively. 
The reliability of the network is calculated as 0.432. The 
impact of the reliability of each type of suppliers on the 
overall reliability of the supply network is shown in Fig. 16. 
It is evident that Type 4 suppliers have the major impact 
while the Type 3 suppliers control the overall reliability 
within a limited range.  
The risk importance measures are calculated for each 
type of the suppliers as shown in Fig. 17. Type 4 suppliers 
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have highest values for all the three measures of Fussel-
Vesely (FV), Risk achievement worth (RAW) and 
Birnbaum importance (BI). Type 3 suppliers have the lowest 
values in all the three measures. 
 
 
 
Fig. 12. Network schematic in R software. 
 
 
Fig. 13. Survival probabilities based on exponential distribution. 
 
 
Fig. 14. Impact of supplier type on the basis of risk profile. 
 
Fig. 15. Impact of supplier type on the basis of network configuration. 
 
Fig. 16. Impact of supplier type reliability on network reliability. 
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 Fig. 17. Risk importance measures. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Supply chain risk management is a promising research 
field demanding development and application of robust risk 
quantification techniques. There is a potential of exploring 
supply chain risk management through the lens of network 
reliability theory. We have introduced a novel application of 
system survival signature in the realm of supply network 
that presents a unique feature of segregating the network 
signature from the risk profiles of suppliers. Furthermore, 
we have adapted the risk importance measures existing in 
the literature of system reliability for analyzing the supply 
network reliability and helping managers take strategic 
decisions pertaining to the network re-configuration and risk 
profile monitoring of suppliers. The application was 
demonstrated through two simple examples that helped 
appreciating the potential of conducting further research in 
this direction. The analysis also revealed the threshold of 
certain suppliers in relation to their impact on the overall 
reliability of the network because of the network survival 
signature. There is requirement of developing robust 
techniques for modeling the network survival signature as 
the complexity of existing supply networks makes it 
difficult to be calculated through existing algorithm used in 
ReliabilityTheory package of R software. Furthermore, 
Bayesian belief network (BBN) modeling technique may be 
explored for evaluating the risk profiles of suppliers keeping 
in view the merit of BBNs in dealing with uncertainty and 
limited or incomplete information. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE IV.  SURVIVAL SIGNATURE (EXAMPLE 1) 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Survival Signature 
0 1 2 0.12 
0 1 3 0.3 
0 1 4 0.48 
0 1 5 0.6 
0 2 1 0.04 
0 2 2 0.27 
0 2 3 0.56 
0 2 4 0.8 
0 2 5 0.9 
0 3 1 0.12 
0 3 2 0.45 
0 3 3 0.75 
0 3 4 0.96 
0 3 5 1 
0 4 1 0.24 
0 4 2 0.66 
0 4 3 0.88 
0 4 4 1 
0 4 5 1 
0 5 1 0.4 
0 5 2 0.9 
0 5 3 1 
0 5 4 1 
0 5 5 1 
1 1 1 0.1 
1 1 2 0.3 
1 1 3 0.54 
1 1 4 0.76 
1 1 5 0.9 
1 2 1 0.19 
1 2 2 0.53 
1 2 3 0.81 
1 2 4 0.97 
1 2 5 1 
1 3 1 0.27 
1 3 2 0.7 
1 3 3 0.925 
1 3 4 1 
1 3 5 1 
1 4 1 0.34 
1 4 2 0.82 
1 4 3 0.97 
1 4 4 1 
1 4 5 1 
1 5 1 0.4 
1 5 2 0.9 
1 5 3 1 
1 5 4 1 
1 5 5 1 
2 1 1 0.12 
2 1 2 0.34 
2 1 3 0.6 
2 1 4 0.84 
2 1 5 1 
2 2 1 0.22 
2 2 2 0.59 
2 2 3 0.87 
2 2 4 1 
2 2 5 1 
2 3 1 0.3 
2 3 2 0.76 
2 3 3 0.97 
2 3 4 1 
2 3 5 1 
2 4 1 0.36 
2 4 2 0.86 
2 4 3 1 
2 4 4 1 
2 4 5 1 
2 5 1 0.4 
2 5 2 0.9 
2 5 3 1 
2 5 4 1 
2 5 5 1 
 
 
 
TABLE V.  SURVIVAL SIGNATURE (EXAMPLE 2) 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Survival Signature 
1 1 0 1 0.5 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 2 1 1 
1 2 0 1 1 
1 2 1 1 1 
1 2 2 1 1 
2 1 0 1 0.5 
2 1 1 1 1 
2 1 2 1 1 
2 2 0 1 1 
2 2 1 1 1 
2 2 2 1 1 
3 1 0 1 0.5 
3 1 1 1 1 
3 1 2 1 1 
3 2 0 1 1 
3 2 1 1 1 
3 2 2 1 1 
 
